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defined and discussed. In the remainder of the book Mezey at- 
tempts a "more detailed assessment of the way in which the five 
legislative types are involved in policy making." (47) His 
thoughtful and challenging comparative analysis of the five types is 
organized around two major concepts: policy-making phases and 
policy-making arenas. Policy-making phases include formulation, 
deliberation, and oversight. A policy-making arena is a physical 
setting within which policy-makers interact-i.e., plenary session, 
party caucus, legislative committee, cabinet, etc. In addition to the 
policy-making function, the legislative types are examined in terms 
of two other "expectations" or functions: representation and system 
maintenance. Concluding his comprehensive survey and analysis of 
the literature on legislatures, Mezey argues that legislatures will 
tend to serve the representation function in the future, in contrast to 
the policy-making and system maintenance "expectations." 
These books are well worth reading. Each presents a wealth of 
detail, interesting theoretical insights, and challenging propositions 
about legislative behavior. Minor shortcomings could be men- 
tioned, but these would be in terms of evaluations and judgment 
rather than of fact. 
JOEL G. VERNER, Illinois State University 
The Organization of Interests: Incentives and the Internal Dynam- 
ics of Political Interest Groups. By TERRY M. MOE. (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1980. Pp. x, 282. $21.00.) 
The Organization of Interests is a welcome addition to the body of 
literature devoted to political interest groups. Moe addresses two 
central questions. Why do people join organizations? Once they 
have become members of an organization, what sustains their 
membership? Earlier, group theorists might have sought an ex- 
planation for these decisions in the putative values of the member- 
ship of the organization. (I say "might have" because it is not clear 
that the decision to join was then a serious issue.) Individuals are 
members because their interests are identical to those articulated by 
the organization. Thus, common interests gave rise to collective 
(group) action. 
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Mancur Olson's subsequent work, The Logic of Collective Action, 
introduced the concepts of collective good and selective incentives to 
show that the bonding material of organizational behavior was not 
shared values, but rather selective incentives as they serve to satisfy 
the personal goals of members of the organization. Rational self- 
interest contributes to a concern for material well-being, and 
political incentives (whether collective goods or purposive incen- 
tives, such as an ideology), are subordinate considerations in the in- 
dividual's calculus of costs and benefits associated with such deci- 
sions. 
The purpose of Moe's book is to suggest a middle ground between 
the two positions. The author seeks to determine whether or not the 
political objectives of an interest group are more salient than Olson's 
model suggests. To this end he examines both case studies of in- 
terest groups abroad and in the United States and questionnaire data 
from five interest groups in Minnesota. 
The Organization of Interests is worth reading. It is unique in its 
effort to examine Olson's model of organizational incentives and 
contains some provocative ideas about the role of organizational 
leadership. Moe's discussion of the Entrepreneur (the leader) has a 
quality that reminds one of Nicolo's advice to his Prince. The En- 
trepreneur is, according to Moe, principally devoted to the max- 
imization of a surplus in the exchange of costs and benefits so that 
the organization can survive. Organizational survival is necessary 
for the career of the Entrepreneur. But the surplus is not necessar- 
ily the same as profits or the attainment of other collective goods. It 
means that the Entrepreneur will maximize his surplus -even at the 
expense of organizational goals -through the selection of an incen- 
tive structure that combines both collective goods and selective in- 
centives. The potential of material self-interest and personal ag- 
grandizement is clear, and an examination of this possibility would 
seem to have been in order. One miglht ask, if the Entrepreneur is 
also susceptible to the siren temptation of self-interest, then where 
are those persons who will hold high the standards of principle and 
cause on behalf of the group? 
The first half of this book, the chapters dealing with the logic of 
individual decisions and intra-organizational politics, provides 
stimulating reading. I regret that the latter half is less rewarding. I 
expected that more would be said of the role of the Entrepreneur, 
whom the author admits to be the pivotal figure for understanding 
organizational incentives, but no effort is made to develop this role 
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beyond chapter 4. Chapter 6 treats pluralism as the traditional 
background for such efforts. But it seems to be a weak transition 
between the micro analysis of the first half of the volume and the 
statement of mixed motivations and the broader treatment afforded 
interest groups of the second. The studies of interest groups cited in 
chapter 7 consistently reveal support for the greater importance of 
economic self-interest as an incentive, evident even among the class- 
conscious British workers. And the data collected by the author, 
from five interest groups in Minnesota, would seem to add a final 
fillip to the pervasiveness of self-interest as an imperative of the 
organization, rather than evidence of a concern for collective goods. 
Moe mnay very well be correct in his belief that there is a mid-field 
position between the group theorists and Olson. His data, however, 
hardly allow him to make a compelling case for his charting of this 
ground. 
RONALD J. BUSCH, Cleveland State University 
Privacy, Law, and Public Policy. By DAVID M. O'BRIEN. (New 
York: Praeger Publishers, 1979. Pp. xiv, 262. $24.95.) 
In the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court 
fashioned a constitutional right-of-privacy, a term not mentioned in 
the Constitution and unknown to its framers. The right was alleged 
to be implied, via "emanations" and "penumbras," in a host of con- 
stitutional guarantees. In more recent cases this pretense has been 
dropped, and in a revival of substantive due process, the concept of 
privacy has been nebulously sheltered in the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, as an aspect of the individual's "liberty" which 
government may not invade. 
To the extent that privacy received recognition as a constitutional 
value prior to Griswold, it was limited to certain specifically defined 
constitutional contexts and was not treated as a right per se, handily 
available for general judicial deployment. The Fourth Amend- 
ment, for example, grants a "right to be let alone," in Justice 
Brandeis's felicitous phrase, but only from unreasonable search and 
seizure. Even there, protection of privacy was not necessarily the 
only, or even principal, motivation of the framers. Justice 
Frankfurter-who, except where considerations of federalism in- 
tervened, generally construed search and seizure restrictions more 
